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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Most risk management is really just advanced contingency planning and disci-
plining yourself to realize that, given enough time, very low probability events not
only can happen, but they absolutely will happen,Goldman Sachs CEO, Lloyd
Blankfein.1
Individuals and organizations seek to insure themselves against risks which can cause sig-
nicant harm. This includes extreme risks, which can be described as very low probability
events, which can cause huge damages. Examples include natural disasters like hurricanes,
and earthquakes, and man-made disasters arising from terrorism or rogue states. A relevant
policy question is whether conventional economic institutions such as insurance are able to
handle such risks. Otherwise it may be appropriate for government to provide insurance to
cover extreme risks; see Torregrosa (2002). In this paper we ask whether extreme risks can be
shared e¢ ciently and if it is possible to trade assets whose pay-o¤s depend on such risks.
Finance theory implies that any risk uncorrelated with market fundamentals should be
traded at its expected value. Hence one would expect that extreme risks like earthquake risks
could be traded at a price close to the expected loss. In fact such risks are rarely traded on
nancial markets. In a few cases markets for catastrophe bonds have been established. For
instance, the Chicago board of trade allows trade in disaster options. However these sell at
very large premiums compared to estimates of the possible losses; see Ja¤ee and Russell (2003).
Thus markets do not appear to be particularly e¤ective at transferring extreme risk.
In law, the force majeure and the act of God clauses appear to be designed to avoid sharing
extreme risks. Common law will often allow performance to be excused and not enforce the
contract if an unforeseen and highly unlikely event occurs. As a result such clauses make the
party, which has paid for performance, bear all the risk of the extreme event and the other
1Katie Holliday, Goldman CEO on risk: The worst absolutely will happen, 25 Jul 2013.
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100915696.
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party bears none of the risk.2 3 Similarly in tort law, the court may not nd an injurer liable
for damage to a victims property, if it was due to an event which could not reasonably have
been foreseen.
At rst sight, these features of nancial markets and contracts do not appear compatible
with our usual models of risk-sharing. Why do insurance contracts contain an act of God clause?
Conventional theory suggests that this failure to write risk-sharing contracts could arise if the
insurance company were considerably more risk averse than its customers, or there is market
failure due to adverse selection.4 Adverse selection is possible, for example, people who live
in known earthquake zones may be more likely to buy insurance. However since insurance
companies have access to detailed actuarial tables, they are typically better informed than
their customers; see Chiappori and Salanie (2000). The alternative hypothesis that insurance
companies are very risk averse is also not highly compelling. Since non-performance clauses
occur frequently it would be desirable to explain them.
In the present paper we show that ambiguity can be a barrier to risk-sharing and hence pro-
vides a potential explanation for failure to share extreme risks. Risks are said to be ambiguous
when the relevant probabilities are impossible or di¢ cult to determine. It is not implausible
that extreme risks might be perceived to be ambiguous. There is currently too little data to
formulate precise probabilities for events which occur once in every 250 years or 500 years. Even
for events which occur once in every 100 years and 50 years, there are considerable uncertainties
about their impact on the economy and society. In our analysis individuals buying and selling
insurance perceive ambiguity di¤erently. Each individual sees his/her own endowment as being
less ambiguous than the endowments of others. This is going to be the main departure from
the bulk of the existing literature. For example, Californians perceive earthquake risk as less
ambiguous than hurricanes, while inhabitants of Florida have the opposite opinion. We show
2These non performance clauses are often used in construction contracts. For example, exceptionally high
realised costs can be used to excuse non-performance by the contractor. As a result all the risk of unforseen or
extreme event is borne by the buyer and the contractor bears no risk. See, Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard
(1916) 172 C 289 where the costs were about ten to twelve times higher than anticipated and the contractor
was excused.
3We were told by Southwest Water (UK) that the contract between Southwest Water (UK) and its regulator
requires the rm to prevent pollution from entering rivers but allows for non-performance when exceptional
events happen.
4Moral hazard is highly unlikely for risks such as earthquakes or hurricanes.
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that extreme risks may not be traded in equilibrium when there are asymmetric perceptions
of ambiguity.
Organisation of the Paper In the remaining part of this section we discuss the relevant
literature and ambiguity, in the next section we explain how we model ambiguity. The analysis
of risk sharing and ambiguity can be found in Section 3. Our conclusions can be found in
section 4. The Appendix contains the proofs of all results not proved in the text.
1.2 Related Literature
Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000) study risk-sharing with Choquet expected utility (hence-
forth CEU) preferences; see Schmeidler (1989). They consider an economy with a single phys-
ical commodity and multiple states of nature. If all individuals have beliefs represented by the
same convex capacity, they show that the equilibrium is identical with one which would be
obtained if all individuals had subjective expected utility (henceforth SEU) preferences and a
particular set of beliefs, ^. Since all competitive equilibria are Pareto optima, any competitive
equilibrium coincides with an equilibrium of the economy with additive beliefs given by ^.
Consequently when all individuals have the same beliefs, ambiguity does not appear to a¤ect
the risk-sharing properties of equilibrium. This was extended by Dana (2004) who analysed
the comparative statics of changes in the endowment. Carlier and Dana (2003) study insurance
against catastrophic losses. However they need to assume that the insurance company is more
ambiguity-averse than its customers to explain why there is a limit on coverage in the event of
disasters. A further extension can be found in Strzalecki and Werner (2011).
Recently, Rigotti and Shannon (2012) have shown that, with variational preferences, equi-
librium risk sharing is equivalent to the case of standard expected utility and equilibrium price
of such trades are generically determinant. This result is similar to that of Chateauneuf, Dana,
and Tallon (2000) and Dana (2004).5
Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) study incentives to bet with MEU prefer-
5Dana and LeVan (2014) have also shown that with maxmin expected utility preferences and incomplete
Bewley preferences e¢ cient equilibrium can exist with common priors.
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ences. If individuals follow SEU and have the same beliefs they will never bet, while if they
have di¤erent beliefs they will always wish to bet. In fact betting is not so widespread, which
they take as evidence against SEU. The authors show that with MEU preferences individuals
with di¤erent beliefs will not wish to bet with one another provided they have at least one prior
in common. If there is no macroeconomic risk they show that in any Pareto Optimum each
individual has certain consumption. However the implications of this result for understanding
risk-sharing are limited by the assumption that there is no macroeconomic risk.
Mukerji and Tallon (2001) use CEU to show that ambiguity can be a barrier to risk-sharing.
There are securities which could, in principle, allow risk to be shared. However each security
carries some idiosyncratic risk. The authors show that if this risk is su¢ ciently ambiguous,
the security will not be traded. They establish a crucial result that ambiguity cannot be
diversied in the same way as probabilistic risk. Hence rms, as well as individuals, may be
ambiguity-averse.
Epstein (2001) shows that ambiguity can explain the consumption home bias paradox. This
arises from failures of risk sharing between countries. Observed consumption is more a¤ected
by shocks to the domestic economy than can be explained by the theoretically predicted level
of international risk sharing. Epstein explains this by hypothesising that individuals perceive
the risks of the foreign economy to be more ambiguous than those to the domestic economy.
Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000) poses a problem to those who wish to explain features
of risk-sharing contracts by ambiguity. According to their result, risk-sharing contracts do not
di¤er in any qualitative way with and without ambiguity. Rigotti and Shannon (2005) suggest
a possible solution using a di¤erent model of ambiguity due to Bewley (2002). They are able
to show with these preferences that ambiguity prevents risk-sharing. The key di¤erence is
that Bewley preferences have a kink at the endowment, while CEU preferences have a kink at
certain consumption. Since there are more places in which kinks can potentially occur, it is
easier to nd failures of risk-sharing.
Although this result solves the problem posed by Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000)
it also creates some new problems. Bewley preferences are incomplete and moreover they
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depend on using an exogenous reference point. In many economic applications it is not easy to
determine where this reference point should be. Moreover incomplete preferences are di¢ cult
to use in conventional economic models.
The present paper uses ambiguity to explain failures of risk-sharing. It uses the CEU
model, which does not rely on an exogenously given status quo point and generates complete
preferences. We assume each individual perceives the risks a¤ecting his/her own endowment as
being less ambiguous than those a¤ecting other peoples endowments. This is not compatible
with the representing beliefs by a common convex capacity. Hence the results of Chateauneuf,
Dana, and Tallon (2000), which suggest that ambiguity does not prevent risk-sharing, do not
apply. Combining their analysis with our own we may conclude that it is not ambiguity per se
but di¤erences in the perception of ambiguity which create barriers to risk-sharing.
1.3 The Ellsberg Paradox
One of the classic pieces of evidence for ambiguity-aversion is the three-ball Ellsberg paradox.
In this thought experiment, a ball is drawn from an urn which contains 90 balls, 30 of which
are red. The remaining balls are either blue or yellow in unknown proportion. There are four
possible acts a; b; c and d, as described in the table below:
30 60
R B Y
Choice 1 a 100 0 0
b 0 100 0
Choice 2 c 100 0 100
d 0 100 100
Subjects are o¤ered two choices. In rst they have to choose between acts a and b; while
in the second they choose between acts c and d: It is found that most subjects prefer option
a in the rst choice and option d in the second. These preferences are not compatible with
expected utility theory or indeed any other plausible decision theory in which decision-makers
assign conventional subjective probabilities to events.
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One way to understand the paradox is that in the second choice, the decision-maker e¤ec-
tively has an endowment of £ 100 if a yellow ball is drawn. He/she is then o¤ered the choice of
extra money if a red ball is drawn or extra money if a blue ball is drawn. Money in the event
that a blue ball is drawn is complementary with the endowment, since it reduces the ambiguity
of the endowment. No such complementarity exists for money in the event that a red ball is
drawn, hence the decision-maker values money when a blue ball is drawn more highly. This
complementarity is not present in the rst choice, which is why the opposite decision is often
made in that case.
1.4 Ambiguity
There is a substantial body of laboratory evidence which shows that individuals behave di¤er-
ently when faced with ambiguous risks (see, for instance, Camerer and Weber (1992) or Kilka
and Weber (2001)). The dominant mode of behaviour observed in experiments is ambiguity-
aversion. People will pay signicant premiums to convert ambiguous risks into risks with known
probabilities.
The traditional model of decision-making under uncertainty is SEU; see Savage (1954).
According to SEU, individuals have beliefs represented by a subjective probability distribu-
tion and act to maximise the expected value of their utility with respect to that probability
distribution. SEU is not able to model the distinction between risk and ambiguity, since all
kinds of uncertainty are represented by a single subjective probability distribution. We model
ambiguity with CEU, which represents beliefs as capacities (non-additive subjective probabil-
ities). Preferences are represented by maximising the expected value of utility with respect to
a capacity. The expectation is expressed as a Choquet integral; Choquet (1953-4). A more
detailed description of CEU is provided later.
Next we provide an example of how di¤erent perceptions of ambiguity may cause failures
of risk-sharing.
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1.5 Example
This section presents an example, which illustrates the main points of our argument. Let
S1 = fs01; s001g ; S2 = fs02; s002g and S = S1  S2: Assume that there are two individuals, 1 and 2,
who have endowments !1 (s01) = 2; !
1 (s001) = 0; and !
2 (s02) = 2; !
2 (s002) = 0 respectively.
1.5.1 Independent Beliefs
First we assume the two individuals have beliefs represented by independent product capacities
on S1S2:We shall show that they will not be prepared to share risk with such beliefs. Assume
that individual 1 has beliefs 1 with additive marginal on S1 given by 1 (s01) = 1 (s
00
1) =
1
2
and non-additive, marginal 1 on S2 given by 1 (s02) = 
1 (s002) =
1 
2
: Similarly individual 2
has beliefs 2 with additive marginal on S2 given by 2 (s02) = 2 (s
00
2) =
1
2
and non-additive,
marginal 2 on S1 given by 2 (s01) = 
2 (s001) =
1 
2
: (Under these assumptions the product
capacities are unique; see Ghirardato (1997).)
Consider acts as follows:
s01; s
0
2 s
0
1; s
00
2 s
00
1; s
0
2 s
00
1; s
00
2
a 2 2 0 0
b 2 0 2 0
c 2 1 1 0
Act a (resp. b) is the pay-o¤ which individual 1 (resp. 2) will receive if (s)he does not trade
and consumes his/her endowment, while act c represents a situation where the two individuals
share risks equally.
Assume that both individuals have the same concave utility function u: We may normalise
by setting u (0) = 0; u (1) = ; and u (2) = 1: The larger is  the more concave is the utility
function. Then with independent beliefs, individual 1s Choquet expected values of acts a and
c are:
V 1 (a) = 1
2
:u (2) = 1
2
;
V 1 (c) = 1
2
h
u (2) : (1 )
2
+ 

1  (1 )
2
i
+ 1
2
 (1 )
2
= (1 )
4
+ 
2
:
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Thus risk-sharing is preferred if and only if
2   1 > : (1)
Concavity of u implies 1 > 2 1 > 0; thus if there is su¢ cient ambiguity, (i.e.  is su¢ ciently
large) then the risk sharing contract (act c) will be not accepted. In the special case where
individual 1 is not risk-averse  = 1
2
; equation (1) can never be satised. If there is ambiguity
there is no preference for risk sharing.
Example 1.1 Assume that endowments are as above and both individuals have utility function
u (x) = ln (1 + x) ; then provided 0 6  6 1
2
; an interior competitive equilibrium exists and the
equilibrium allocations and prices are as given in the table below.6
s01; s
0
2 s
0
1; s
00
2 s
00
1; s
0
2 s
00
1; s
00
2
xA 2 1 + 2 1  2 0
xB 2 1  2 1 + 2 0
p 1 3
2(1 )
3
2(1 )
3(1+)
(1 )
:
These results are intuitive. If  = 0 there is no ambiguity and risk sharing is complete. If
0 <  < 1
2
there is partial risk sharing, while if  > 1
2
there is no risk sharing in equilibrium.
Hence ambiguity can be a barrier to risk-sharing. Each individual has higher consumption in the
state which is complementary with his/her endowment. This reduces the amount of ambiguity
which (s)he faces. As ambiguity increases, the price of the consumption good increases in all
states in which it is relatively scarce.7
This example illustrates some of the main points of the paper. Ambiguity can be a barrier to
risk-sharing. In two cases we nd there is no risk-sharing. With linear utility and independent
beliefs, individuals do not wish to share ambiguous risks. There is also no risk-sharing if
individuals express extreme ambiguity-aversion. With concave utility, individuals may wish to
6A proof can be found in the Appendix.
7At rst sight it may look as if the prices tend to innity as  ! 1: However the prices are calculated under
the assumption of an interior equilibrium. This is not valid for  > 12 : In fact equilibrium prices are nite for
all values of :
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share ambiguous risks. However they will undertake less risk-sharing than in the absence of
ambiguity. If utility is concave there is a trade-o¤. For the usual reasons diminishing marginal
utility of wealth encourages people to share risks. However ambiguity-aversion is a barrier to
risk-sharing. If there is su¢ cient ambiguity then there will be no risk-sharing in equilibrium.
1.5.2 Non-Independent Beliefs
We shall now modify the example to show that when beliefs are not independent, risk-sharing
may occur even when individuals are ambiguity-averse. Suppose now that both individuals
have beliefs dened by a capacity  dened as follows:
 (fSg) = 1;  (fs01; s02g) =  (fs001; s002g) =  (fs01; s02g ; fs001; s002g) =  (?) = 0
 (fs01; s002g ; fs002; s01g) =  (fs01; s02g ; fs01; s002g ; fs001; s02g) =  (fs01; s002g ; fs001; s02g ; fs001; s002g) = 2 + 
and all other events have capacity ; where  > 0;  > 0 and 2 +  < 1: This capacity is, by
construction, a belief function and hence convex. However it is not an independent product.
Capacity 0 is given to the event that both endowments have a high pay-o¤  (s01; s
0
2) = 0.
However the event that the endowment of individual 1 yields a high pay-o¤ is not believed to
be impossible on its own ( (fs01; s02g ; fs01; s002g) = ). With these beliefs we can show that there
is a motive for risk-sharing despite the presence of ambiguity. The Choquet expected values of
acts a; b and c as dened in the previous section are as follows:
V 1 (a) = 2: (fs01; s02g ; fs01; s002g) = 2 = V 2 (b) ;
V 1 (c) = V 2 (c) = 2: (fs01; s02g) + 1: [ (fs01; s02g ; fs01; s002g ; fs001; s02g)   (fs01; s02g)] = 2+ :
Hence both individuals would prefer sharing risks (i.e. act c) to consuming their endowment.
Thus when agents do not believe risks to be independent, they may wish to share ambiguous
risks even if their utility is linear.
2 MODELLING AMBIGUITY
This section introduces CEU, which is our main theory of ambiguity. We consider a nite set
of states of nature S. The set of outcomes is denoted by X. An act is a function from S to
X. The set of all acts is denoted by A(S). We shall restrict attention to the case where beliefs
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are represented by convex capacities. A capacity assigns non-additive weights to subsets of S.
Formally, they are dened as follows.
Denition 2.1 A convex capacity on S is a real-valued function  on the subsets of S which
satises A  B )  (A) 6  (B) ;  (?) = 0;  (S) = 1; and  (A) +  (B) 6  (A [B) +
 (A \B), for all A;B  S:
Schmeidler (1989) argues that convex capacities represent ambiguity-aversion and Wakker
(2001) has argued that convexity is implied by a generalised version of the Allais paradox.
Denition 2.2 The degree of ambiguity of capacity  is dened by:
() = 1 max
AS
[(A) + (:A)] :8
If beliefs are represented by a capacity  on S, the expected utility of a given act can be
found using the Choquet integral, dened below.
Notation 2.1 Since S is nite, one can order the utility from a given act a : u (a1) > u (a2) >
::: > u (ar 1) > u (ar) ; where u (a1) ; : : : ; u (ar) are the possible utility levels yielded by act a:
Denote by Ak (a) = fs 2 Sj u(a(s)) > u  akg the set of states that yield a utility at least as
high as ak: By convention, let A0(a) = ;:
Denition 2.3 The Choquet expected utility of u with respect to capacity  is:
Z
u(a(s))d(s) =
rX
k=1
u
 
ak

[(Ak(a))  (Ak 1(a))]:
Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa (1987) and Sarin and Wakker (1992) provide axioms for repre-
senting preferences by a Choquet integral of utility.
8This is not a perfect measure of ambiguity since it does not separate ambiguity and ambiguity-aversion.
However the distinction is not so important for the issues discussed in the present paper. It is the combination
of ambiguity and ambiguity-aversion, which can provide a barrier to risk sharing. Ambiguity would not matter
if individuals were not averse to it. For more detailed theories of ambiguity see Epstein (1999), Epstein and
Zhang (2001) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).
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Denition 2.4 Let  be a capacity on S i: The core of ; C () is dened by
C () = fp 2 (S i) ; 8A  S i; p (A) >  (A)g :
The following result shows that for a convex capacity, the Choquet integral for a given act
a is equal to the minimum over the core of the expected value of a: Hence convex capacities
provide an attractive representation of pessimism. When a decision-maker does not know the
true probabilities (s)he considers a set of probabilities to be possible and evaluates any given
act by the least favourable of these probabilities. For a proof see the Proposition in Schmeidler
(1989).
Proposition 2.1 If  is an convex capacity on S i; then
R
ad = minp2C()Epa; where E
denotes the expected value of a with respect to the additive probability p:
3 RISK-SHARING WITH AMBIGUITY
In this section we argue that di¤erences in the perception of ambiguity are a barrier to risk-
sharing. We study a standard economy, where individuals would share risk in the absence of
ambiguity.
3.1 The Economy
We consider an exchange economy with uncertainty. There are n individuals 1 6 i 6 n and
one physical commodity. The state space S; is a Cartesian product, S = S1 S2 ::: Sn: As
usual we use S i to denote j 6=iSj and s i denotes a typical element of S i. There are markets
in all state contingent commodities. The endowment of individual i; !i (si) is independent of
s i. Thus Si is a set of factors which a¤ect is endowment but not the endowment of any other
individual. Each individual faces some risks, which can shock his/her endowment. The risks
di¤erent individuals face are independent. It would be possible to add a common shock which
a¤ects all individuals, however this would not change our conclusions. The key feature of our
model is that each individual regards the shocks to his/her own endowment as unambiguous
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but perceives the shocks to the endowments of others as ambiguous. This is modelled by our
assumptions on beliefs as described below.
Individual i has beliefs represented by a convex capacity i on S with an additive marginal
i on Si: By Lemma 2.1 of Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2005) this implies that
Z
f (si; s i) di (s) =
X
si2Si
i (si)
Z
f (si; s i) di (s i) ;
where i is a convex capacity on S i: Since individual i believes that the shocks to his/her own
endowment are unambiguous i is assumed to be additive.9
3.2 Concave Utility
In this section we assume that individuals have concave utility, i.e. ui is concave for 1 6 i 6 n:
Thus, apart from ambiguity, our assumptions are standard in risk-sharing models.10 Now
equilibrium is determined by the interaction of two e¤ects. Ambiguity-aversion creates a barrier
to sharing ambiguous risks, while diminishing marginal utility of wealth makes it desirable to
smooth consumption across states for the usual reasons. In the resulting equilibrium there will
be a trade-o¤ between these two e¤ects. First a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Let  be a convex capacity on S then
Z
u (a) d 6 (1  )max
s2S
u (a (s)) + min
s2S
u (a (s)) :
The next result shows that if there is su¢ cient ambiguity-aversion, each individual con-
sumes his/her endowment plus a riskless lump sum tax or subsidy. It follows that competitive
equilibrium is unique and involves no trade. This holds even though risk-sharing is desirable
in the absence of ambiguity. These results are not restricted to competitive trade. They would
also imply the absence of risk-sharing in situations where one party is able to make take it
9In general there are many capacities on a product space, which are compatible with given marginal capacities
on the components. However when one marginal is additive and the other is convex the product capacity is
unique; see Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) and Ghirardato (1997).
10In this context, terms such as risk or risk-sharing should not be taken to imply the absence of ambiguity.
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or leave ito¤ers to the other as is standard in principal-agent models. It would also apply to
Coasian e¢ cient bargaining.
Theorem 3.1 If ui is concave for 1 6 i 6 n, there exists  such that if 1 > i > ; for
1 6 i 6 n; then an allocation x = hx1; :::; xni is Pareto optimal if and only if it has the form
xi (s) = !i (si) + i; where
Pn
i=1 i = 0.
3.3 Linear Utility
In this section we assume that the marginal utility of wealth is constant. This is to isolate
the e¤ects of ambiguity by removing any other reason for risk-sharing. Here we show that if
individuals have linear utility and risks are independent then they will bear their own ambiguous
risks in any Pareto optimum. Thus ambiguity creates a barrier to risk-sharing.
Let  be the additive probability distribution on S; which is the independent product of
the marginals i for 1 6 i 6 n: Similarly let  i be the additive probability distribution on
S i; which is the independent product of the marginals j for j 6= i: The following assumption
is a maintained hypothesis for this section.
Assumption 3.1  i 2 int C (i) :
We interpret C (i) as the set of probability distributions, which i believes are possible.
This assumption implies that there is a limited amount of agreement between the beliefs of
di¤erent individuals since they all believe the probability distribution  is possible. Moreover
as  i 2 int C (i) ; i believes that it is possible for the probability to deviate from  i in
any direction. The shocks to other individualsendowments appear ambiguous to individual i:
He/she believes that these shocks may be described by any probability distribution in the set
C (i) :
Let L denote the vector space of real-valued functions on ni=1Si: Let h 2 L be dened by
h (s) =  (s) and h 2 Ln by h = 
h; :::; h ; (n times). Consider the hyperplane H dened by:
H =
n
z 2 Ln :Pnj=1Ps2S  (s)  zj (s)  j = 0o or H = fz 2 Ln : h: (z   ) = 0g : We shall
show that H is a separating hyperplane through the endowment points.
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Lemma 3.2 Suppose that z is not independent of s i and h: (zi   i) 6 0 then !i (si) + i i
!i (si) + zi (s) :
The next result shows that with linear utility and ambiguity-aversion, each individual con-
sumes his/her endowment plus a non-stochastic lump sum tax or subsidy.
Proposition 3.1 If ui is linear, for 1 6 i 6 n; then an allocation x = hx1; :::; xni is Pareto
optimal if and only if it has the form xi (s) = !i (si) + i; where
Pn
i=1 i = 0.
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Proof. First we shall show that the allocation !i (si)+i; 1 6 i 6 n; is Pareto optimal. Suppose
yi (s) = !i (si) +  i (s) <i !i (si) + i for 1 6 i 6 n: Feasibility implies that
Pn
i=1  i (s) = 0: By
Lemmas A.1 and 3.2, if !i +  i is preferred to !i + i we must have h: ( i   i) > 0: Adding
up implies that h: ( i   i) = 0 for 1 6 i 6 n: By Lemma 3.2, if there exists k such that
k (s) is not independent of s k then !k (sk) + k k !k (sk) + k (s) : Hence for 1 6 i 6 n;
 i (s) is independent of s i: However since
Pn
i=1  i (s) = 0; this is only possible if  i is constant
for 1 6 i 6 n: Thus we must have  i (s) = i for 1 6 i 6 n; which demonstrates that
!i (si) + i; 1 6 i 6 n; is Pareto optimal.
To prove the converse, let ~xi = !i (si) + i (s) ; 1 6 i 6 n; be a feasible allocation i.e.Pn
i=1 i (s) = 0: We shall show that it can only be Pareto optimal if it has the stated form.
Dene j 2 R by j =
P
s2S  (s) j (s) : By construction h: (   ) = 0: Suppose that k is not
independent of s k then by Lemma 3.2, !k (sk) + k k !k (sk) + k (s) : Thus if !i (si) + i (s)
is Pareto Optimal, i must be independent of s i: It is also not possible that for some k; k is
a non-trivial function of sk: Together with
Pn
i=1 i (s) = 0 this implies that there exists j 6= k
such that j is also a non-trivial function of sk: However we have already argued that j must
be independent of s j: The only remaining possibility is that i is constant for 1 6 i 6 n: The
result follows.
We have shown that if all individuals have linear utility, ambiguous risks will not be shared.
This holds even if individuals only display small degrees of ambiguity-aversion. In many con-
tracts some of the parties are insurance companies or large rms, which may well be risk-neutral
11Although Proposition 3.1 requires Assumption 3.1, this assumption is implied automatically by the hy-
potheses of Theorem 3.1.
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in the sense of having linear utility. This result tells us that they would be expected to bear
their own ambiguous risks. Our analysis would be applicable to the usual principal-agent
model, where the principal has linear utility. In this model it is usual to assume that one
individual is able to make take it or leave it o¤ers to the others, which would result in a Pareto
optimal allocation.
4 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have used the CEU model to show that ambiguity-aversion may reduce risk-
sharing. There are two alternative models of ambiguity, the MEU model and the smooth model
of ambiguity due to Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005).12 If the smooth model is used,
our results would need to be modied. The proof that no risk is shared in equilibrium, depends
on the fact that CEU preferences have a kink at certain consumption. Smooth preferences,
as the name implies, do not have a kink. In this case ambiguity would reduce risk-sharing,
however we could not conclude that no risk would be shared even for high levels of ambiguity-
aversion. Since MEU preferences also have a kink at certain consumption we believe it would
be possible to prove similar results for such preferences.
In our model each party perceives the risk to his/her own endowment as unambiguous,
while the risk to the other partys endowment is seen as ambiguous. In practice force majeure
and act of God clauses often apply to risks which both parties believe are ambiguous. We
believe it would be possible to extend our analysis to this case. Suppose that there are two
individuals. Each of them views the risk to his/her own endowment as less ambiguous than
the risk to the other partys endowment. We conjecture that a similar result will hold, even
though individuals agree which risks are ambiguous. Ambiguity will reduce risk-sharing. The
di¢ culty with this approach is that, at present, there is no generally agreed denition of when
one event is more ambiguous than another. Consequently we shall leave this extension for
future research.
12As discussed earlier, in a recent paper Rigotti and Shannon (2012) using variational preferences show that
as long as risks are correlated, risks can be shared even for ambiguous events.
15
In this model, all competitive equilibria are Pareto optima. Thus although there is no
risk-sharing in equilibrium, there is no possible government intervention in markets which can
bring about a Pareto improvement. It is possible that other kinds of intervention might be
desirable. For instance, the government could act to reduce ambiguity about future events by
providing information about the likelihood of extreme events. This can facilitate risk-sharing.
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A APPENDIX
Proof of Example 1.1: Assume that xA (s01; s
0
2) > xA (s01; s002) and xA (s001; s02) > xA (s001; s002) :
Then individual As preferences are given by the Choquet integral:
V A
 
xA

=
1
2

1  
2
u
 
xA (s01; s
0
2)

+
1 + 
2
u
 
xA (s01; s
00
2)

+
1
2

1  
2
u
 
xA (s001; s
0
2)

+
1 + 
2
u
 
xA (s001; s
00
2)

:
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Similarly if we assume u
 
xB (s01; s
0
2)

> u
 
xB (s001; s
0
2)

and u
 
xB (s01; s
00
2)

> u
 
xB (s001; s
00
2)

individual Bs preferences can be represented by the Choquet integral:
V B
 
xB

=
1
2

1  
2
u
 
xB (s01; s
0
2)

+
1 + 
2
u
 
xB (s001; s
0
2)

+
1
2

1  
2
u
 
xB (s01; s
00
2)

+
1 + 
2
u
 
xB (s001; s
00
2)

:
Now specialise to the case where u (x) = ln (1 + x) : Checking the marginal conditions are
satised at the proposed solution:
MRSAfs01;s02gfs01;s002g =
2(1 )
3
= MRSBfs01;s02gfs01;s002g =
1
3
1
2 2
= 1
p(s01;s002)
;
MRSAfs01;s02gfs001 ;s02g =
2(1 )
3
= MRSBfs01;s02gfs001 ;s02g =
1
p(s001 ;s02)
;
MRSAfs01;s02gfs001 ;s002g =
(1 )
3(1+)
= MRSBfs01;s02gfs001 ;s002g =
1
p(s001 ;s002)
:
By concavity, these conditions are su¢ cient for utility maximisation. One can check that
supply equals demand in each state and that the two budget constraints are satised.
Proof of Lemma 3.1:
R
u (a) d = u (a1) (A1 (a)) +
Pr 1
i=2 u (a
i) [ (Ai (a))   (Ai 1 (a))]
+u (ar) [1   (Ar 1 (a))] 13
6 (1  )u (a1)u+ u (ar) ; since 1   (Ar 1 (a)) > 1   (SnAr 1 (a))   (Ar 1 (a)) > :
= (1  )maxs2S u (a (s)) + mins2S u (a (s)) :
Proof of Theorem 3.1: First we shall show that the allocation !i (si) + i; 1 6 i 6 n; is
Pareto optimal. Let hi 2 L be dened by
hi =



 
s1i

u0i
 
!i
 
s1i

+ i

; :::; 
 
sKii

u0i
 
!i
 
sKii

+ i

;
where Si =

s1i ; :::; s
Ki
i
	
: Dene h 2 Ln by h = 1

hh1; :::; hni ; where
 =
Pn
j=1
P
Sj
 (s)u0j
 
!j (sj) + j

:14 Thus h is a normalised vector of marginal rates of
substitution. Consider the hyperplane H in Ln dened by: H = fz 2 Ln : h:z = 0g : We shall
show that H is a separating hyperplane through the allocation !i (si)+i; 1 6 i 6 n and hence
13See Notation 2.1.
14Recall L denotes the vector space of real-valued functions on ni=1Si:
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a Pareto improvement is not possible.
Lemma A.1 Suppose that hi:zi 6 0 (resp. hi:zi < 0) and zi is independent of s i i.e. zi (s) =
zi (si), then !i (si) + i <i !i (si) + i + zi (si) (resp. !i (si) + i i !i (si) + i + zi (si)).
Proof. V i (!i (si) + i + zi (si)) =
P
Si
i (si)
R
ui (!i (si) + i + zi (si)) di (s i)
6
P
Si
i (si)ui (!i (si) + i) +
P
Si
i (si)u
0
i (!i (si) + i) zi (si)
6
P
Si
i (si)ui (!i (si) + i) : The last inequality applies because hi:zi 6 0 implies thatP
Si
i (si)u
0
i (!i (si) + i) zi (si) 6 0: The proof of the other case is similar.
Lemma A.2 Suppose that z is not independent of s i and hi:zi 6 0 then if i is su¢ ciently
large !i (si) + i i !i (si) + i + zi (s) :
Proof. Dene m =
P
Si
i (si)mins i2S i ui (!i (si) + i + zi (si; s i))
6
P
Si
i (si)mins i2S i [ui (!i (si) + i) + u
0
i (!i (si) + i) zi (si; s i)]
=
P
Si
i (si)ui (!i (si) + i) +
P
Si
i (si)mins i2S i [u
0
i (!i (si) + i) zi (si; s i)]
<
P
Si
i (si)ui (!i (si) + i) +
P
Si
i (si)u
0
i (!i (si) + i) zi (si; s i) :
The inequality follows since a weighted average is greater than a minimum. The fact that z is
not independent of s i; ensures that the inequality is strict.
Hence m <
P
Si
i (si)ui (!i (si) + i) ; since hi:zi 6 0 impliesP
Si
i (si)u
0
i (!i (si) + i) (zi (si; s i)) 6 0: The result now follows from Lemma 3.1.
This conclusion only holds if i is su¢ ciently ambiguity-averse. The reason is that diminish-
ing marginal utility of income generates a demand for risk-sharing in the usual way. It is only
when ambiguity-aversion is su¢ ciently high, that this demand goes to zero.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (continued) Suppose !i (si) +  i (s) + i <i !i (si) + i for
1 6 i 6 n: Feasibility implies that
Pn
i=1  i (s) = 0: By Lemmas A.1 and A.2, if this preference
holds for i su¢ ciently large, hi: i > 0: Since 0 = h:
Pn
i=1  i =
Pn
i=1 hi: i we must have
hi: i = 0; for 1 6 i 6 n: By Lemma A.2, there cannot exist k such that k (s) is not independent
of s k; since otherwise we would have !k (sk)+k k !k (sk)+k+k (sk; s k) for k su¢ ciently
large. Hence for 1 6 i 6 n;  i (s) is independent of s i: However since
Pn
i=1  i (s) = 0 this is
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only possible if  i is constant for 1 6 i 6 n: Thus we must have  i (s) = i for 1 6 i 6 n; which
demonstrates that !i (si) + i; 1 6 i 6 n; is Pareto optimal.
Thus it follows that for all vectors of net trades  = h1; :::; ni there exists  ; 0 6  < 1;
such that if  < i 6 1 for 1 6 i 6 n; then !i + i <i !i + i +  i; with at least one strict
preference. Let Z = f = h1; :::; ni : kk 6 1; 1 6 i 6 n;
Pn
i=1  i = 0g denote the set of net
trades in the unit ball. Dene  = max

 :  2 Z
	
: Since we are maximising a continuous
function over a compact set, the maximum is attained and we must have 0 6  < 1: If
1 > i > ; for 1 6 i 6 n; then there are no net trades in the unit ball, which will not make at
least one individual worse o¤. By Lemma A.3 this implies that there are no Pareto improving
net trades. Hence !i + i; 1 6 i 6 n; is Pareto Optimal.
To prove the converse, let xi = !i (si) + i (s) ; 1 6 i 6 n; be a feasible allocation i.e.Pn
i=1 i (s) = 0. We shall show that it is only Pareto optimal if it has the stated form. Dene
j 2 R by j =
P
s2S  (s) j (s) : By Lemma A.2, there cannot exist k such that k (s) is not
independent of s k; since otherwise we would have !k (sk) + k k !k (sk) + k (s) when k is
su¢ ciently large. Thus if !i (si) + i (s) is Pareto Optimal, i must be independent of s i; for
1 6 i 6 n:
It is also not possible that for some k; k is a non-trivial function of sk: Together withPn
i=1 i (s) = 0 this implies that there exists j 6= k such that j is also a non-trivial function of
sk: However we have already argued that j must be independent of s j: The only remaining
possibility is that i is constant for 1 6 i 6 n: The result follows.
Lemma A.3 If 1 > i > ; for 1 6 i 6 n; and there are no Pareto improving net trades, ;
such that kk 6 1; then there are no Pareto improving net trades.
Proof. Let z be a net trade such that kzk > 1. We may write z = ^; where kk 6 1 and
^ > 1: Since there are no Pareto improving net trades in the unit ball, there must exist j such
that !j + j j !j + j + j: Dene
 () = V j
 
!j + j + j

=
X
Sj
j (sj)
Z
uj
 
!j (sj) + j + j (s)

dj (s j)
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=
P
Sj
j (sj)minp2C(j)Epuj
 
!j (sj) + j + j (s)

dj (s j) : The function  is concave, since
concavity is preserved by the min operation and by taking linear combinations.
By concavity, V j
 
!j + j

=  (0) 6  (1)   0 (1) = V j  !j + j + j   0 (1) :15 Since
!j + j j !j + j + j; we must have 0 (1) < 0: Concavity also implies, V j
 
!j + j + zj

=


^

6  (1)+

1  ^

0 (1) <  (1) = V j
 
!j + j + j

6 V j
 
!j + j

: This demonstrates
that the net trade z makes individual j worse o¤ and is therefore not a Pareto improvement.
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Let s i (si) = argmax z (si; s i) and s i (si) = argmins i2S i zi (si; s i) :
Dene a probability distribution ~si on S i by ~si (s i (si)) =  i (s i (si))  ; ~si
 
s i (si)

=
 i
 
s i (si)

+ ; ~si (s i) =  i (s i) otherwise. Since  2 int C () for  su¢ ciently small
~si 2 C () :
Now V i (!i (si) + z (s)) =
P
Si
i (si)
R
!i (si) + zi (si) di (s i)
6
P
Si
i (si)
P
S i ~si (s i) (!i (si) + zi (si)) ; since ~si 2 C () ;
<
P
Si
i (si)
P
S i  i (s i) (!i (si) + zi (si))
=
P
Si
i (si) (!i (si) + i) = V
i (!i (si) + i) :
15Strictly speaking  may not be di¤erentiable at 1; in which case 0 (1) should be interpreted as a super-
di¤erential.
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